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Abstract
We consider the well-studied Hospital Residents (HR) problem in the presence of lower quotas
(LQ). The input instance consists of a bipartite graph G = (R∪H, E) where R and H denote sets
of residents and hospitals respectively. Every vertex has a preference list that imposes a strict
ordering on its neighbors. In addition, each hospital h has an associated upper-quota q+(h) and
lower-quota q−(h). A matching M in G is an assignment of residents to hospitals, and M is said
to be feasible if every resident is assigned to at most one hospital and a hospital h is assigned at
least q−(h) and at most q+(h) residents.
Stability is a de-facto notion of optimality in a model where both sets of vertices have pref-
erences. A matching is stable if no unassigned pair has an incentive to deviate from it. It is
well-known that an instance of the HRLQ problem need not admit a feasible stable matching.
In this paper, we consider the notion of popularity for the HRLQ problem. A matching M is
popular if no other matching M ′ gets more votes than M when vertices vote between M and
M ′. When there are no lower quotas, there always exists a stable matching and it is known that
every stable matching is popular.
We show that in an HRLQ instance, although a feasible stable matching need not exist,
there is always a matching that is popular in the set of feasible matchings. We give an efficient
algorithm to compute a maximum cardinality matching that is popular amongst all the feasible
matchings in an HRLQ instance.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider the Hospital Residents problem in the presence of Lower Quotas
(HRLQ). The input to our problem is a bipartite graph G = (R∪H, E) where R denotes the
set of residents, and H denotes the set of hospitals. Every resident as well as hospital has
a non-empty preference ordering over a subset of elements of the other set. Every hospital
h ∈ H has a non-zero upper-quota q+(h) denoting the maximum number of residents that
can be assigned to h. In addition, every hospital h also has a non-negative lower-quota
q−(h) denoting the minimum number of residents that have to be assigned to h. The goal
is to assign residents to hospitals such that the upper and lower quotas of all the hospitals
are respected (that is, it is feasible) as well as the assignment is optimal with respect to the
preferences of the participants.
I Definition 1. A feasible matching M in G = (R ∪ H, E) is a subset of E such that
|M(r)| ≤ 1 for each r ∈ R and q−(h) ≤ |M(h)| ≤ q+(h) for each h ∈ H, where M(v) is the
set of neighbors of v in M .
Stability is a de-facto notion of optimality in settings where both sides have preferences. A
matching M (not necessarily feasible) is said to be stable if there is no blocking pair with
respect to M . A resident-hospital pair (r, h) blocks M if r is unmatched in M or prefers h
over M(r), and either |M(h)| < q+(h) or h prefers r over at least one resident in M(h).
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There are simple instances of the HRLQ problem where there is no feasible matching
that is stable. We give an example here: Let R = {r},H = {h1, h2}, q+(h1) = q+(h2) = 1,
q−(h1) = 0, and q−(h2) = 1. Let preference list of r be 〈h1, h2〉. That is, r prefers h1 over h2.
The only stable matching here is M1 = {(r, h1)} which is not feasible as |M1(h2)| < q−(h2).
On the other hand, the only feasible matching M2 = {(r, h2)} is not stable as (r, h1) is a
blocking pair with respect to M2. This raises the question, given an HRLQ instance G,
does G admit a feasible stable matching? This can be answered by constructing an HR
instance G+ by disregarding the lower quotas of all hospitals in G. It is well-known that the
Gale-Shapley algorithm [5] computes a stable matching M in G+. Furthermore, from the
“Rural Hospitals Theorem" it is known that, in every stable matching of G+, each hospital
is matched to the same capacity [6, 16]. Thus G admits a stable feasible matching if and
only if M is feasible for G.
The HRLQ problem is motivated by practical scenarios like assigning medical interns
(residents) to hospitals. While matching residents to hospitals, rural hospitals often face the
problem of being understaffed with residents, for example the National Resident Matching
Program in the US [3, 15, 16]. In such real-world applications declaring that there is no
feasible stable matching is simply not a solution. On the other hand, any feasible matching
that disregards the preference lists completely is socially unacceptable. We address this issue
by relaxing the requirement of stability by an alternative notion of namely popularity. Our
output matching M has two desirable criteria – firstly, it is a feasible matching in the in-
stance, assuming one such exists, and hence no hospital remains understaffed. Secondly, the
matching respects preferences of the participants, in particular, no majority of participants
wish to deviate to another feasible matching in the instance.
Our contribution: We consider the notion of popularity for the HRLQ problem. Pop-
ularity is a relaxation of stability and can be interpreted as overall stability. We define it
formally in Section 2. In this work, we present an efficient algorithm for the following two
problems in an HRLQ instance.
1. Computing a maximum cardinality matching popular in the set of feasible matchings.
We give an O(|R|(|E|+ |H|)) time algorithm for this problem.
2. Computing a popular matching amongst maximum cardinality feasible matchings. We
give an O(|R|2(|E|+ |H|)) time algorithm for this problem.
Our algorithms are based on ideas introduced in earlier works on stable marriage (SM) and
HR problems[11, 3, 14]. However, in SM and HR problem, a popular matching is guaranteed
to exist because a stable matching always exists and it is also popular. On the other hand,
in the HRLQ setting even a stable matching may not exist. Yet, we prove that a feasible
matching that is popular amongst all feasible matchings always exists and is efficiently
computable. We believe that this is not only surprising but also a useful result in practical
scenarios. Moreover, our notion of popularity subsumes the notions proposed in [3] and [14]
and is more general than both. In [3], popularity is proved using linear programming, but
our proofs for popularity are combinatorial.
Overview of the algorithm: Our algorithms are reductions, that is, given an HRLQ
instance G, both our algorithms construct instances G′ and G′′ of the HR problem such
that there is a natural way to map a stable matching in G′ (respectively, G′′) to a feasible
matching in G. Moreover, any stable matching in G′ (G′′) gets mapped to a maximum
cardinality matching that is popular amongst all the feasible matchings in G (respectively,
a matching that is popular amongst all maximum cardinality matchings in G).
Organization of the paper: We define the notion of popularity in Section 2. The reduction
for computing a maximum cardinality popular matching amongst feasible matchings is given
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in Section 3 and its correctness is proved in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 describes the
reduction for computing a matching that is popular amongst maximum cardinality feasible
matchings and its correctness.
Related work: The notion of popularity was first proposed by Gärdenfors [7] in the stable-
marriage (SM) setting, where each vertex has capacity 1, and have been well-studied since
then [2, 10, 11, 9, 4, 12]. A linear-time algorithm to compute a maximum cardinality popular
matching in an HR instance is given in [3] and [14] with different notions of popularity.
Furthermore, for the SM and HR problem, it is known that a matching that is popular
amongst the maximum cardinality matchings exists and can be computed in O(mn) time
[11, 14]. The reductions in our paper are inspired by the work of [3, 4, 11, 14]. In all these
earlier works, the main idea is to execute Gale and Shapley algorithm on the HR instance
and then allow unmatched residents to propose with increased priority [11] certain number
of times. As mentioned in [11], this idea was first proposed in [13]. The HRLQ problem
has been recently considered in [1] and [8] in different settings.
2 Notion of Popularity
The notion of popularity uses votes from vertices to compare two matchings. For r ∈ R,
and any matching M in G, if r is unmatched in M then, M(r) = ⊥. A vertex prefers any of
its neighbours over ⊥. For a vertex u ∈ R ∪H, let x, y ∈ N(u) ∪ {⊥}, where N(u) denotes
the neighbours of u in G. We define voteu(x, y) = 1 if u prefers x over y, −1 if u prefers
y over x and 0 if x = y. Given two matchings M1 and M2 in the instance, for a resident
r ∈ R, we define voter(M1,M2) = voter(M1(r),M2(r)).
Voting for a hospital: A hospital h is assigned q+(h)-many votes to compare two match-
ings M1 and M2; this can be viewed as one vote per position of the hospital. If a position
is not filled in a matching, we put a ⊥ there, so that |M1(h)| = |M2(h)| = q+(h). In our
voting scheme, the hospital h is indifferent betweenM1 andM2 as far as its |M1(h)∩M2(h)|
positions are concerned.
To compare between the two sets of residentsM1(h)\M2(h) andM2(h)\M1(h), a hospital
can decide any pairing of the elements of these two sets. We denote this correspondence by
corrh. Under this correspondence, for a resident r ∈ M1(h) \M2(h), corrh(r,M1,M2) is
the resident in M2(h) \M1(h) corresponding to r. We define
voteh(M1,M2) =
∑
r∈M1(h)\M2(h)
voteh(r, corrh(r,M1,M2))
A hospital h prefers M1 over M2 if voteh(M1,M2) > 0. We can now define popularity.
I Definition 2. A matching M1 is more popular than M2 (denoted as M1  M2) if∑
v∈R∪H votev(M1,M2) >
∑
v∈R∪H votev(M2,M1). A matching M is popular if there is no
matching M ′ such that M ′ M .
There are several ways for a hospital to define the corr function. For example, a hospital
h may decide to order and compare the two sets in the decreasing order of preferences (as
in [14] or in the most adversarial order (as in [3]). That is, the order due to which h gives
the least votes to M1 when comparing it with M2. We believe that our definition offers
flexibility to hospitals to compare residents in M1(h) \M2(h) and M2(h) \M1(h) according
to their custom designed criteria.
Decomposing M ⊕M ′: In the one-to-one setting, where M ⊕M ′ for any two matchings
M and M ′ is a collection of vertex-disjoint paths and cycles. Our setting is many-to-one
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and hence M ⊕M ′ has a more complex structure. Here, we recall a simple algorithm to
decompose edges of M ⊕M ′ into (possibly non-simple) alternating paths and cycles from
[14]. Consider the graph G˜ = (R∪H,M⊕M ′), for any two feasible matchings of the HRLQ
instance. We note that the degree of every resident in G˜ is at most 2 and the degree of every
hospital in G˜ is at most 2 · q+(h). Consider any connected component C of G˜ and let e ∈M
be any edge in C. We show how to construct a unique maximal M -alternating path or cycle
ρ containing e: Start with ρ = 〈e〉. Use the following inductive procedure.
1. Let r ∈ R be one end-point of ρ, and let (r,M(r)) ∈ ρ. We grow ρ by adding the edge
(r,M ′(r)). Similarly if (r,M ′(r)) ∈ ρ, add (r,M(r)) to ρ.
2. Let h ∈ H be an end-point of ρ, and let the last edge (r, h) on ρ be in M \M ′. We
extend ρ by adding corrh(r,M,M ′) if is not equal to ⊥. A similar step is performed if
the last edge on ρ is (r, h) ∈M ′ \M .
3. We stop the procedure when we complete a cycle (ensuring that the two adjacent residents
of a hospital are corr for each other according to the hospital), or the path can no longer
be extended. Otherwise we go to Step 1 or Step 2 as applicable and repeat.
Labels on edges: While comparing a matching M1 with another matching M2, the voting
scheme induces a label on edges of M2 with respect to M1. Let (r, h) ∈ M2. The label
of (r, h) is (a, b) where a = voter(M1(r),M2(r)) and b = voteh(corrh(r,M2,M1), r). Thus
a, b ∈ {−1, 1}.
3 Reduction to HR problem
In this section we present our reduction from an HRLQ instance G = (R∪H, E) to an HR
instance G′ = (R′ ∪ H′, E′). To compute a largest size feasible matching that is popular
amongst all feasible matchings, we compute a stable matching M ′ in G′. We show that
there is a natural map from any stable matching M ′ in G′ to a feasible matching M in G.
Before we describe the reduction in detail, we provide some intuition. Our reduction
simulates the following algorithm: Execute the hospital-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm
on G by disregarding lower quotas of all hospitals. Let M0 be a matching obtained. If some
hospitals are under-subscribed1 in M0, they apply with increased priority to residents (in
order of preference) and a new matching M1 is obtained. If there are deficient hospitals in
M1, they again apply with an even higher priority. This process is repeated until there is
no deficient hospital. This is achieved by reducing G to an HR instance G′ described below:
We first describe the vertices in G′.
The set H′: For each hospital h ∈ H we have ` copies h0, . . . , h`−1 of h in H′. Here
` = 2 +
∑
h∈H q
−(h). We need to define the capacities2 of all hospitals h ∈ H′ (recall G′ is
an HR instance, so we do not have lower quotas for h ∈ H′). The hospitals in H′ and their
capacities are as described below:
H′ = {h0, . . . , h`−1 | h ∈ H}
Capacities of h ∈ H′: q+(hs) = q+(h), s ∈ {0, 1}
q+(hs) = q−(h), s ∈ {2, . . . , `− 1}
1 We say that a hospital is under-subscribed in a matching M if |M(h)| < q+(h) and is deficient if
|M(h)| < q−(h)
2 We use the term capacity for the hospitals in an HR instance whereas the term quota for hospitals in
an HRLQ instance.
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We call hospital hs ∈ H′ a level-s copy of h. Note that if h ∈ H has zero lower-quota, then
h1, . . . , h`−1 have zero capacity in H′. For a hospital h ∈ H, we denote by qh the sum of the
capacities of all level copies of h in G′. The following observation is immediate.
I Observation 1. For a hospital h ∈ H, the sum of capacities of all level copies of h in G′ is
qh = 2 · q+(h) + (`− 2) · q−(h).
The set R′: The set of residentsR′ consists of the setR along with a set of dummy residents
Dh corresponding to every hospital h ∈ H. The set R′ and Dh are as defined below:
R′ = R∪
( ⋃
h∈H
Dh
)
where Dh =
⋃
s∈{0,...,`−2}
Dsh ∀h ∈ H
Here Dsh = {dsh,1, . . . , dsh,q+(h)}, s ∈ {0, 1}
and Dsh = {dsh,1, . . . , dsh,q−(h)}, s ∈ {2, . . . , `− 2}
We refer to Dh as dummy residents corresponding to h and Dsh as level-s dummy residents
corresponding to h. For h ∈ H, if q−(h) = 0, then Dsh = ∅ for each s ∈ {2, . . . , `− 1}.
The following observation captures the number of dummy residents corresponding to every
hospital h ∈ H.
I Observation 2. For a hospital h ∈ H, the total number of dummy residents corresponding
h in R′ is |Dh| = 2 · q+(h) + (`− 3) · q−(h).
Preference lists: We denote by 〈listr〉 and 〈listh〉 the preference lists of r and h in G
respectively. Furthermore, 〈Dsh〉 denotes the strict list consisting of elements of Dsh in in-
creasing order of indices. Finally, ◦ denotes the concatenation of two lists. We now describe
the preferences of hospitals and residents in G′.
Hospitals’ preference lists: Consider a hospital hs ∈ H′ for s ∈ {1, . . . , ` − 2} and let q
denote the capacity of hs. The preference list of hs is of the form: q-dummy residents of
level-(s− 1), followed by preference list of h in G, followed by q dummy residents of level-s.
For h0, the preference list is the preference list of h in G followed by capacity many dummy
residents of level-0. Finally, for h`−1, there are dummy residents of level-(`− 2) followed by
preference list of h in G. For hs ∈ H′,
s = 0 : 〈listh〉 ◦ 〈D0h〉
s = 1 : 〈D0h〉 ◦ 〈listh〉 ◦ 〈D1h〉
s = 2 : 〈d1h,k, . . . , d1h,q+(h)〉 ◦ 〈listh〉 ◦ 〈D2h〉, k = q+(h)− q−(h) + 1
s ∈ {3, 4, . . . , `− 2} : 〈Ds−1h 〉 ◦ 〈listh〉 ◦ 〈Dsh〉
s = `− 1 : 〈D(`−2)h 〉 ◦ 〈listh〉
Residents’ preference lists:
For r ∈ R : 〈listr〉`−1 ◦ 〈listr〉`−2 ◦ . . . ◦ 〈listr〉0
For h ∈ H, dsh,i ∈ Dh :
s = 0 : 〈h0, h1〉
s = 1, i ∈ {1, . . . , q+(h)− q−(h)} : 〈h1〉
s = 1, i ∈ {q+(h)− q−(h) + 1, . . . , q+(h)} : 〈h1, h2〉
s ∈ {2, . . . , `− 2} : 〈hs, hs+1〉
3.1 Properties of the stable matching M ′ in G′
With respect to a stable matching M ′ in G′ we introduce the following definitions.
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I Definition 3. Level-s resident: A non-dummy resident r ∈ R′ is said to be at level-s
in M ′ if r is matched to a level-s hospital in M ′. Let R′s denote the set of level-s residents.
I Definition 4. Active hospital: A hospital hs is said to be active in M ′ if M ′(hs)
contains at least one non-dummy resident. Otherwise, (when all positions of hs are matched
to dummy residents), hs is said to be inactive.
In the following lemma, we state some invariants for any stable matching M ′ in G′. These
invariants allow us to define a natural map from M ′ to a matching M in G, and to show
that M is feasible as well as popular among feasible matchings.
I Lemma 5. The following hold for any stable matching M ′ in G′:
1. For any h ∈ H, M ′ matches at most q+(h) non-dummy residents across all its level
copies in G′.
2. The matching M ′ in G′ leaves only the level-(` − 1) copy of any hospital (if it exists)
under-subscribed.
3. Let hs ∈ H′ be active in M ′. Then,
a. At least one position of hs−1 is matched in M ′ to a dummy resident at level-(s− 1).
b. For 0 ≤ j ≤ s− 2, hj is inactive in M ′ and all positions of hj are matched to dummy
residents of level-(j).
c. For s + 2 ≤ j ≤ ` − 1, hj is inactive in M ′ and all positions of hj are matched to
dummy residents of level-(j − 1).
4. For any h ∈ H, at most two consecutive level copies hs and hs+1 are active in M ′.
5. A level-s resident r in M ′ does not have any hospital h in its preference list which is
active at level-(s+ 2) or more in M ′.
Proof. Proof of 1: Consider the set of dummy residents corresponding to a hospital
h ∈ H i.e. ⋃`−2s=0Dsh. With the exception of h2, for any hs, D(s−1)h are the most preferred
q+(hs) dummy residents of hs. Thus these dummy residents can never remain unmatched
in M ′. The only dummy residents that are not the first choice of any hospital and hence
can remain unmatched are the subset of D1h consisting of the first q+(h)− q−(h) dummy
residents from D1h. This is because, by construction of G′, only the last q−(h) dummy
residents from D1h are present in the preference list of h2 as its top q+(h2) top-choices.
Thus the total number of dummy residents for h is given by |Dh| = 2·q+(h)+(`−3)·q−(h).
Total capacity of all the copies of h in G′ is qh = 2 · q+(h) + (` − 2) · q−(h). Number
of dummy residents in Dh that can remain unmatched in any stable matching M ′ in G′
is at most q+(h) − q−(h). Thus the number of true residents matched to h in M ′ is at
most qh − |Dh|+ q+(h)− q−(h) which is q+(h).
Proof of 2: Consider a hospital h ∈ H. For each copy hs of h in H′, where s < `− 1, the
dummy residents of level s have hs as their first choice. Further, their number is same
as q+(hs). Thus hs can not remain undersubscribed in any stable matching M ′ of G′,
otherwise these dummy residents will form a blocking pair with hs.
Proof of 3a: For the sake of contradiction, assume that hs−1 is not matched to any
level-(s− 1) dummy resident and still hs is matched to a non-dummy resident. As there
are exactly q+(hs) many level-(s− 1) dummy residents in the preference list of hs, and
each level-(s− 1) dummy resident has only hs−1 and hs in its preference list, this means
that there is a level-(s − 1) dummy resident d unmatched in M ′. But hs prefers any
level-(s−1) dummy resident over any non-dummy resident. Thus (d, hs) forms a blocking
pair with respect to M ′, contradicting the stability of M ′.
Proof of 3b: If hs is active and hj is matched to a non-dummy resident r for some
0 ≤ j ≤ s − 2, then (r, h(s−1)) is a blocking pair with respect to M’. This is because,
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as proved above, h(s−1) must be matched to at least one resident in D(s−1)h , and h(s−1)
prefers any non-dummy resident over any dummy resident in D(s−1)h .
Proof of 3c: If hs is active then hj can not be active for s + 2 ≤ j ≤ ` − 1 else h(s+1)
must be matched to a resident from D(s+1)h as proved above, and then each non-dummy
resident r in M ′(hs) forms a blocking pair with hj contradicting the stability of M ′.
But if hs is active, then hj can not be matched to a dummy resident from Djh either,
otherwise a resident in M ′(hs) forms a blocking pair with hj . The later is true because
any resident in listh prefers hj over hs for j > s and hj prefers any resident in listh
to any dummy resident in Djh. Hence hj must be matched to only dummy residents in
D(j−1)h .
Proof of 4: Assume the contrary. Thus let h be a hospital such that there are two levels
i and j, j < i − 1, where hi and hj are matched to one or more non-dummy residents.
Further, assume that hi is matched to ri and hj be matched to rj . Then, by Invariant
4 above, hi−1 must be matched to at least one (i − 1)-level dummy resident. But, by
the structure of preference lists, hi−1 prefers a non-dummy resident, and hence rj , over
any (i − 1)-level dummy resident. Also, rj prefers hi−1 over hj since j < i − 1. Thus
(rj , hi−1) forms a blocking pair in G′ with respect to M ′, contradicting the stability of
M ′.
Proof of 5: Let there be an edge (r, ht) in G′ such that r is a level-s resident and t ≥ s+2
and ht is active in M ′. Then, by Invariant 3a, hs+1 has at least one level-(s+ 1) dummy
resident in M ′(hs+1). As r has edge to ht, r also has an edge to hs+1 by construction
of G′. Also, again by construction of G′, r prefers any level-(s + 1) hospital over any
level-s hospital and hs+1 prefers any non-dummy resident in its preference list over any
level-(s + 1) dummy resident. Thus (r, hs+1) forms a blocking pair with respect to M ′
in G′, contradicting its stability.
J
4 Maximum cardinality popular matching
In this section, we show how to use the reduction in the previous section to compute a max-
imum cardinality matching that is popular amongst all feasible matchings.. Thus, amongst
all feasible matchings, our algorithm outputs the largest popular matching. We call such a
matching a maximum cardinality popular matching.
Our algorithm reduces the HRLQ instance G to an HR instance G′ as described in
Section 3. We then compute a stable matching M ′ in G′. Finally, to obtain a matching M
in G we describe a simple map function. For every h ∈ H, let M(h) = R∩
(⋃`−1
s=0M
′(hs)
)
.
Note that M(h) denotes the set of non-dummy residents matched to any copy hs of h in
M ′. Thus, a resident r is matched to a hospital h in M if and only if r is matched to a
level-s copy of h in M ′ for some s ∈ {0, . . . , ` − 1}. We say that M = map(M ′). We now
show some useful invariants about the matching M = map(M ′).
Division of R and H into subsets: We divide the residents and hospitals in G into
subsets depending upon a matching M ′ in G′. Let Ri be the set of non-dummy residents
matched to a level-i hospital hi in M ′. We define the same set Ri in G as well. Further,
define Hj to be the set of hospitals h ∈ H such that R∩M ′(hj) 6= ∅, that is, level-j copy hj
of h is matched to at least one non-dummy resident in M ′. Define the unmatched residents
to be in R0. Also, a non-lower-quota hospital h such that M(h) = ∅ is defined to be in H1,
and a lower-quota hospital h with M(h) = ∅ is defined to be in H`−1. The following lemma
summarizes the properties of the sets Ri and Hj .
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I Lemma 6. Let M = map(M ′) where M ′ is a stable matching in G′. Then, the following
hold:
1. Each hospital is present in at most two sets Hj , Hj+1 for some j. We say that h ∈
Hj ∩Hj+1.
2. If h ∈ Hj ∩Hj+1, then there is no edge from h to any r ∈ Ri where i ≤ j − 1.
3. All the non-lower-quota hospitals that are undersubscribed in M are in H1. Moreover,
no hospital that is undersubscribed in M is in H0.
4. All the deficient lower-quota hospitals from M are in H`−1.
5. If a non-lower-quota hospital is undersubscribed, it has no edge to any resident in R0.
If a lower-quota hospital is deficient, it does not have an edge to any resident in Ri for
i < ` − 1. Similarly an unmatched resident does not have an edge to any hospital in
H1 ∪ . . . ∪H`−1.
6. Let h ∈ H be such that |M(h)| > q−(h). Then h /∈ H2 ∪ . . . ∪H`−1.
Proof. We prove each statement below:
Proof of 1: This directly follows from part 4 of Lemma 5.
Proof of 2: Follows from part 5 of Lemma 5.
Proof of 3: Let h be undersubscribed in M . Thus |M(h)| < q+(h). We show that
h /∈ H0 by showing that h0 cannot be active in M ′. For the sake of contradiction, let
(r, h0) ∈ M ′. Thus r ∈ 〈listh〉. As h is undersubscribed in M , h0 must be matched
in M ′ to at least one dummy resident in D0h, and consequently, h1 must be matched to
at least one dummy resident in D1h. But r prefers h1 over h0 in G′ and h1 prefers any
resident from 〈listh〉 over any resident in D1h. Thus (r, h1) forms a blocking pair w.r.t.
M ′, contradicting the stability of M ′ in G′. Hence h0 cannot be active in M ′ and hence
h /∈ H0.
Let h be a non-lower-quota hospital undersubscribed in M . By construction of G′, the
hospitals h2, . . . , h`−1 have capacity zero and hence cannot be matched to any resident
in M ′. Therefore h /∈ H2 ∪ . . . ∪ H`−1. Combining with the above argument, h /∈ H0,
and hence h ∈ H1.
Proof of 4: If a lower-quota hospital h is deficient in M , one of its copies is undersub-
scribed in M ′. By part 2 of Lemma 5 only h`−1 can remain undersubscribed in M ′.
Moreover, as h`−1 is undersubscribed, no hs, s < ` − 1 can be active, otherwise its
matched resident creates a blocking pair with h`−1.
Proof of 5: Let there be an edge (r, h) in G such that h is a non-lower-quota hospital
undersubscribed in M , and let r ∈ R0. By part 3 above, h ∈ H1.
If r is unmatched in M and hence in M ′, then (r, h0) blocks M ′. This is because,
since h1 is active in M ′ implies that M ′(h0) must contain a dummy resident in D0h.
But h0 prefers any resident in 〈listh〉 over any resident in D0h and r prefers h0 since r
in unmatched in M ′.
If r is matched in M and hence in M ′, it must be matched to a hospital h¯ ∈ H0 in
M , and hence to h¯0 in M ′. But any resident prefers a level-1 hospital over any level-0
hospital in its preference list. Also note that since h ∈ H1 and is undersubscribed,
M(h0) = D0h. Thus, M(h1) contains at least one dummy resident from D1h. Since h1
prefers r over a dummy resident in D1h, it is clear that (r, h1) forms a blocking pair
with respect to M ′.
A similar argument applies to the case when h is a deficient lower-quota hospital in M .
Now let a resident r be unmatched in M and hence in M ′, and suppose there is an edge
(r, h) where h ∈ Hi for i > 0. As h ∈ Hi, by part 3a of Lemma 5, M ′(h0) contains at
least one dummy resident in D0h. As (r, h) is an edge in G, r ∈ 〈listh〉. But h0 prefers
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any resident in 〈listh〉 over any resident in D0h, thus (r, h0) blocks M ′ contradicting its
stability.
Proof of 6: For the sake of contradiction, assume that h ∈ Hs for s ≥ 2 and still
|M(h)| > q−(h). In this case, q−(h) > 0 otherwise in G′, q+(h2) = . . . = q+(h(`−1)) = 0
and hence h /∈ Hs for any s ≥ 2. We consider two cases:
Case 1: h ∈ Hs for s ≥ 3: Consider the matching M ′ in G′. In this case, by part 3b of
Lemma 5, the level copies h0 and h1 are inactive and M ′(hi) = Dih for i ∈ {0, 1}. But
then, as in the proof of part 1 of Lemma 5, all the dummy residents must be matched
in M ′. Recall that all the dummy residents in Dh except the first q+(h)− q−(h) ones in
D1h are top choices of some copy of h. Moreover, for each s except s = 1, q+(hs) = |Dsh|.
Thus the only dummy residents that can remain unmatched in a stable matching in G′
are the first q+(h) − q−(h) dummy residents from D1h. As they are matched in M ′ by
above argument, |M(h)| ≤ |R ∩ M ′(h)| ≤ qh − |Dh| ≤ q−(h). This contradicts our
assumption that |M(h)| > q−(h).
Case 2: h ∈ H1 ∩H2: Then, in G′, M ′(h0) = D0h, M ′(hs) = D(s−1)h for 3 ≤ s ≤ `− 1 by
parts 3b and 3c of Lemma 5 respectively. Thus M ′(h1) has no resident from D0(h) and
M ′(h2) has no resident from D2h. Let k be the number of non-dummy residents matched
to h1 in M ′.
If k ≥ q−(h), then at most first q+(h) − q−(h) dummy residents from D1h are present
in M ′(h1). Thus all the positions of h2 get matched to residents from D1h. Recall that
|D1h| = q+(h) = q+(h1) whereas q+(h2) = q−(h) and only the last q−(h) residents from
D1h are present in the preference list of h2. Thus h2 can not be active inM ′, contradicting
the assumption that h ∈ H1 ∩H2.
Therefore k < q−(h). Thus exactly k positions of h2 are matched to dummy residents
from D1(h). We claim that the remaining q+(h2)−k = q−(h)−k positions of h2 must be
matched to non-dummy residents inM ′. If not, then h2 must be matched to some dummy
resident in D2(h), as h2 is their top choice. This contradicts the above statement that
M ′(h2) has no resident from D2h. Thus total number of non-dummy residents matched
to h in M is k + q−(h)− k = q−(h) contradicting the assumption that |M(h)| > q−(h).
J
Throughout the following discussion, assume that M is a matching which is a map of a
stable matching M ′ in G′ and N is any feasible matching in G. We prove below that M is
in fact feasible in G.
I Theorem 7. If G admits a feasible matching, then M = map(M ′) is feasible for G.
Proof. Suppose M is not feasible. Thus, there is a deficient lower-quota hospital h in M .
Let N be a feasible matching in G. Consider decomposition of M ⊕N into (possibly non-
simple) paths and cycles as described in Section 2. As h is deficient in M and not deficient
in N , there must be a path ρ in M ⊕ N ending in h. Moreover, if the other end of ρ is a
hospital h′ then |M(h′)| − |N(h′)| > 0. Note that in this case, ρ has even-length and hence
ends with a M -edge. The other case is where ρ ends in a resident r and hence ends with a
N -edge. We consider the two cases below:
ρ ends in a hospital h′: As h is deficient in M , h ∈ H`−1 by part 4 of Lemma 6.
Also, since |M(h′)| > |N(h′)| ≥ q−(h′), by part 6 of Lemma 6, h′ ∈ H0 ∪ H1. Thus ρ
starts at H`−1 and ends in H0 or H1. Let ρ = 〈h, r1, h1, r2, h2, . . . , rt, ht, r′, h′〉, where
(ri, hi) ∈ M and (r′, h′) ∈ M . We show below that such a path ρ can not exist and
hence M must be feasible.
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By part 5 of Lemma 6, h has edges only to residents in R`−1. Hence r1 ∈ R`−1 and
hence h1 ∈ H`−1. By part 2 of Lemma 6, h1 has no edges to residents in R0∪ . . .∪R`−3.
Therefore r2 ∈ R`−1 ∪R`−2 and h2 ∈ H`−1 ∪H`−2. Thus each hi ∈ ρ can not be in Hj ,
for any j < `−i. But h′ ∈ H0∪H1 and hence r′ ∈ R0∪R1. Therefore ht /∈ H3∪. . .∪H`−1
by part 2 of Lemma 6, otherwise (ht, r′) edge can not exist in G. In other words, ρ has to
contain at least one hospital from each level i, 1 ≤ i ≤ `− 1. Thus t ≥ `− 2. Moreover,
all the hospitals in ρ which are in H`−1 ∪ . . .∪H2 are lower-quota hospitals. Thus ρ has
at least t+ 1 = `− 1 lower-quota hospitals. Note that this count includes repetitions, as
a hospital can appear multiple times in ρ. However, any hospital in H2 ∪ . . .∪H`−1 can
not be matched to more than q−(h) residents in M by part 6 and hence can appear at
most q−(h) times on ρ. But then the sum of lower quotas of all the hospitals is ` − 2,
contradicting that ρ has a total of `− 1 occurrences of lower-quota hospitals. Thus such
a path ρ can not exist and M must be feasible.
ρ ends in a resident r: Now consider the case where ρ ends at a resident r. Then the
last edge on ρ must be a N -edge and hence r is unmatched in M . Therefore r ∈ R0.
Let ρ = 〈h, r1, h1, r2, h2, . . . , rt, ht, r〉 where (ri, hi) ∈M for 1 ≤ i ≤ t and the remaining
edges are in N . Consider the first hospital, say hj on ρ such that hj ∈ H2 and for each
hi, i < j, hi ∈ H3 ∪ . . . ∪H`−1. Such an hj has to exist by the argument given for the
previous case. Moreover, j ≥ ` − 2 as ρ has to contain at least one hospital from each
level as described in the previous case. Thus the number of occurrences of lower-quota
hospitals on ρ exceeds the sum of lower quotas and hence such a ρ can not exist.
This completes the proof of the lemma. J
In Lemma 8 and Theorem 9 below, we give crucial properties of the division of R and
H that will be helpful in proving popularity of the matching M which is a map of a stable
matching M ′ in G′.
I Lemma 8. Let N be any feasible matching. Let (r, h) ∈ M and (r′, h) ∈ N such that
r′ =corrh(r,M,N). Further let h ∈ Hj ∩Hj+1 and r ∈ Rj+1. Further, let r′ ∈ Rj. Then
the label on (r′, h) edge is (−1,−1).
Proof. Clearly r′ is not matched to h in M , as corr(r) is picked only from M(h)⊕M ′(h)
and r′ ∈M ′(h). Let r′ ∈M(h′). Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that (r′, h) does not
have (−1,−1) label. Consider the same edge in G′. In G′, this is an edge between a j-level
resident and a j + 1-level hospital. The label on (r′, h) in G can not be (×, 1), as this cause
the label on the (r′, hj+1) edge in G′ to be (1, 1). This is because, if h prefers r′ over r in
G, the preference remains same in G′ as well. On the other hand, r′ prefers any j + 1-level
hospital over any j-level hospital, and hence hj+1 over h′j . So it must be the case that the
label on (r′, h) in G must be (1,−1). But in this case, in G′, hj is matched to one of its last
dummies since hj+1 is active. Thus (r′, hj) forms a blocking pair with respect to M ′ in G′.
This proves that the label on (r′, h) in G must be (−1,−1). J
Let ρ be a path inM⊕N whereM is the map of a stable matchingM ′ in G′ and N is any
feasible matching in G. Here ρ is constructed according to the decomposition described in
Section 2. Furthermore, the labels on edges of N \M are assigned as described in Section 2.
The following theorem is similar to the one proved in [11] for the stable marriage setting.
We adapt the proof here for our setting.
I Theorem 9. Let ρ = 〈h0, r1, h1, r2, h2, . . . , ht, rt+1〉. Moreover, let h0 ∈ Hp ∩ Hp+1 and
rt+1 ∈ Rq. Then the number of (1, 1) edges in ρ is at most the number of (−1,−1) edges
plus q − p. Thus (rk, hk) ∈M for all k and (hk, rk+1) ∈ N with rk+1 =corrhk(rk,M,N).
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Proof. We prove this by induction on the number of (−1,−1) edges. Note that, except h0,
all the his are matched in M ′, and hence we can consider them at the same level as their
matched residents.
Base case: Let ρ have no (−1,−1) edges. As ρ starts at h ∈ Hp ∩Hp+1, r1 has to be in
level-p+ 1 or above. This is because there is no edge from h to a resident in R0∪ . . .∪Rp−1,
and if r1 ∈ Rp then the label on (h0, r1) must be (−1,−1) by Lemma 8. By assumption,
there is no (−1,−1) edge in ρ. So r1 ∈ Rj for some j, p+ 1 ≤ j ≤ `. Therefore h1 ∈ Hj .
Thus the path can only use edges from a hospital at a lower level to a resident at the
same or higher level. Further, there is no (1, 1) edge in Hk × Rk for any k. So (1, 1) edges
can appear in ρ only when it goes from a hospital in a lower level to a resident in a higher
level. So there can be at most q − p many (1, 1) edges on ρ.
Induction step: Let the theorem hold for at most i − 1 many (−1,−1) edges. Let
(hk, rk+1) be one such edge. Further, let hk ∈ Ha and rk+1 ∈ Rb. Consider the two
subpaths ρ1 = 〈h0, . . . , rk〉 and ρ2 = 〈hk+1 . . . , rt+1. As the number of (−1,−1) edges in
each of ρ1 and ρ2 is less than i, the induction hypothesis holds. Therefore, the number of
(1, 1) edges in ρ1 is at most a − p plus the number of (−1,−1) edges in ρ1. Similarly, the
number of (1, 1) edges in ρ2 is q − b plus the number of (1, 1) edges in ρ2. The number
of (−1,−1) edges in ρ is one more than the total number of (−1,−1) edges in ρ1 and ρ2.
Hence the number of (1, 1) edges in ρ is at most the number of (−1,−1) edges in ρ plus
a− p+ q − b− 1. As there is an edge between hk and rk+1, b ≥ a− 1 by Invariant 2. Thus
a− p+ q − b− 1 ≤ q − p, which completes the proof. J
The following theorem shows that M is a popular matching amongst all the feasible
matchings in G.
I Theorem 10. Let N be any feasible matching in G.
1. If ρ is an alternating cycle in the decomposition ofM⊕N , then ∆(M⊕ρ,M) ≤ ∆(M,M⊕
ρ).
2. If ρ is an alternating path in the decomposition of M ⊕ N with exactly one end-point
matched in M , then ∆(M ⊕ ρ,M) ≤ ∆(M,M ⊕ ρ).
3. If ρ is an alternating path in the decomposition ofM⊕N with both the end-points matched
in M then ∆(M ⊕ ρ,M) ≤ ∆(M,M ⊕ ρ).
Proof. 1. Let ρ be an alternating cycle in M ⊕ N . Further, let (r, h) ∈ M . Consider
ρ′ = ρ \ {(r, h)} is an alternating path from h to r which starts and ends at the same
level. Hence the number of (1, 1) edges on ρ′ is at most the number of (−1,−1) edges
on ρ′. The same holds for ρ.
2. Let ρ be an alternating path in M ⊕N with exactly one end-point matched in M . Thus
ρ has even length, and both its end-points are either hospitals or both are residents.
Consider the first case. So let ρ = 〈h0, r1, h1, . . . , rt, ht〉 where (ri, hi) ∈ M for all i.
Thus |M(h0)| < |N(h0)| ≤ q+(h0), and hence h0 is under-subscribed. Then by part 3 of
Lemma 6 and feasibility of M , h0 /∈ H0. By feasibility of N , ht ∈ H0 ∪H1. As (rt, ht) ∈
M , r ∈ R0 ∪ R1 by the definition of levels. Consider the subpath ρ′ = ρ \ {(rt, ht)} i.e.
the path obtained by removing the edge (rt, ht) from ρ. Applying Theorem 9 to ρ′ with
p ≥ 1 and q = 0 or q = 1, we get that the number of (1, 1) edges on ρ′ is at most the
number of (−1,−1) edges on ρ′.
Consider the case when both the end-points of ρ are residents. Thus ρ =
〈r0, h1, r1, . . . , ht, rt〉 where (hi, ri) ∈ M for all i. Again consider ρ′ = ρ \ {(ht, rt)}.
As r0 is unmatched in M , r0 ∈ R0 by the definition of levels. Applying Theorem 9 to
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ρ′ with q = 0, we get that the number of (1, 1) edges on ρ′ is at most the number of
(−1,−1) edges on ρ′.
3. Consider the case when both the end-points of the alternating path ρ are matched in
M . Thus one end-point of ρ is a hospital whereas the other end-point is a resident. Let
ρ = 〈r0, h0, . . . , rt, ht〉 where (ri, hi) ∈ M for all i. Hence |M(ht)| > |N(ht)| ≥ q−(ht)
by feasibility of N . Therefore ht ∈ H0 ∪ H1 by part 6 of Lemma 6 which implies that
rt ∈ R0 ∪ R1. Consider the subpath ρ′ = ρ \ {(r0, h0), (rt, ht)}. Thus ρ′ begins at h0
and ends at rt. Applying Theorem 9 with q = 1 and 0 ≤ p ≤ ` gives that the number
of (1, 1) edges on ρ′, and hence on ρ, is at most one more than the number of (−1,−1)
edges on ρ. These votes in favor of N are compensated by the end-points r0 and ht as
r0 is unmatched in N and |M(ht)| > |N(ht)|.
This completes the proof of the theorem. J
The following lemma proves that M is a maximum cardinality popular matching in G.
I Lemma 11. For any feasible matching N in G such that |N | > |M |, ∆(N,M) < ∆(M,N).
Proof. Consider M ⊕ N . There is an alternating path ρ in M ⊕ N such that ρ has both
the end-points unmatched/undersubscribed in M and the path begins and ends with edges
in N . Let ρ = 〈h0, r1, h1, . . . , rt, ht, rt+1〉 where (ri, hi) ∈ M for each i. As h0 is under-
subscribed in M , and rt+1 is unmatched in M , by the definition of levels and part 3 of
Lemma 6, h0 ∈
⋃(`−1)
j=1 Hj and rt+1 ∈ R0. Further, by part 5 of Lemma 6, there is no edge
from h0 to any r ∈ R0 and no edge from rt+1 to any h ∈ H1 ∪ . . . ∪ H`−1. The path ρ
begins in
⋃(`−1)
j=1 Hj and has to end in R0, and the only edges to R0 are from vertices in
H0 ∪H1. Further, each ri, i ≤ t is matched in M and hence the corresponding hospital hi
is at the same level as ri. By part 2 of Lemma 6, if hi ∈ H2 ∪ . . . ∪H(`−1) then ri+1 /∈ R0
for any i. Therefore there must be an edge (hi, ri+1) on ρ such that hi ∈ H1 and ri ∈ R0
and 1 ≤ i ≤ t− 1. By Lemma 8, this edge must be labelled (−1,−1). Now consider the two
subpaths ρ1 = 〈h0, r1, h1, . . . , ri〉 and ρ2 = 〈hi+1, ri+2, . . . , ht, rt+1〉. These are the subpaths
obtained by removing the subpath ri, hi, ri+1, hi+1 from ρ. By assumption, hi ∈ H1 and
ri+1 ∈ R0, hence ri ∈ R1 and hi+1 ∈ H0. Therefore, applying Theorem 9 to ρ1 and ρ2 gives
that the number of (1, 1) edges on ρ1 and ρ2 are at most the number of (−1,−1) edges on
them. Thus N does not get more votes than M on ρ1 or ρ2. Further, M gets two more
votes on the (hi, ri+1) edge. Hence the lemma follows. J
5 Popular matching amongst maximum cardinality feasible matchings
In this section, we modify the reduction in Section 3 to obtain a matching that is popular
amongst all the maximum cardinality feasible matchings of the HRLQ instance. The re-
duction is very similar to the one described in Section 3 except for the number of copies of
each hospital. The HR instance G′ described in Section 3, has ` = 2 +
∑
h∈H q
−(h) copies
corresponding to each hospital in G.
5.1 Reduction to HR instance
Given HRLQ instance G = (R∪H, E), the corresponding HR instance G′′ = (R′′∪H′′, E′′)
is as follows. We set ` = |R|+∑h∈H q−(h). We start with the vertices in G′′.
The set H′′: For every hospital h ∈ H, we have ` copies of h in H′′. The set H′′ and the
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capacities are as given below.
H′′ = {h0, . . . , h`−1 | h ∈ H}
Capacities of h ∈ H′′: q+(hs) = q+(h), s ∈ {0, . . . , |R| − 1}
q+(hs) = q−(h), s ∈ {|R|, . . . , `− 1}
The following observation is immediate.
I Observation 1. For a hospital h ∈ H, the sum of capacities of all level copies of h in G′′ is
qh = |R| · q+(h) + (`− 2) · q−(h).
The set R′′: The set of residents R′′ consists of the set R along with a set of dummy
residents Dh corresponding to every hospital h ∈ H. The set R′′ and Dh are as defined
below:
R′′ = R∪ (⋃h∈HDh) where Dh = ⋃s∈{0,...,`−1}Dsh ∀h ∈ H
where Dsh = {dsh,1 . . . , dsh,q+(h)}, s ∈ {0, |R| − 1}
and Dsh = {dsh,1 . . . , dsh,q−(h)}, s ∈ {|R|, . . . , `− 2}
Here Dh is the set of dummy residents corresponding to h and Dsh is the set of level-s dummy
residents corresponding to h. Note that Dsh = ∅ for each s ∈ {|R|, . . . , ` − 1} if q−(h) = 0.
The following observation captures the number of dummy residents corresponding to every
hospital h ∈ H.
I Observation 2. For a hospital h ∈ H, the total number of dummy residents corresponding
h in R′′ is |Dh| = |R| · q+(h) + (`− 3) · q−(h).
Preference lists: Recall that the preference list of a resident r in G is denoted by 〈listr〉
and that of a hospital h is 〈listh〉.
Hospitals’ preference lists: For hs ∈ H′′:
s = 0 : 〈listh〉 ◦ 〈D0h〉
s ∈ {1, . . . , |R| − 2} : 〈Ds−1h 〉 ◦ 〈listh〉 ◦ 〈Dsh〉
s = |R| − 1 : 〈d|R|−2h,k , . . . , d|R|−2h,q+(h)〉 ◦ 〈listh〉 ◦ 〈D|R|−1h 〉, k = q+(h)− q−(h) + 1
s ∈ {|R|, . . . , `− 2} : 〈Ds−1h 〉 ◦ 〈listh〉 ◦ 〈Dsh〉
s = `− 1 : 〈D(`−1)h 〉 ◦ 〈listh〉
Residents’ preference lists:
For r ∈ R : 〈listr〉(`−1) ◦ . . . ◦ 〈listr〉0
For h ∈ H, dsh,i ∈ Dh :
s ∈ {0, . . . , `− 2} \ {|R| − 1} : 〈hs, hs+1〉
s = |R| − 1, i ∈ {1, . . . , q+(h)− q−(h)} : 〈h(|R|−1)〉
s = |R| − 1, i ∈ {q+(h)− q−(h) + 1, . . . , q+(h)} : 〈h(|R|−1), h|R|〉
The following lemma summarizes properties of a stable matchingM ′′ inG′′. It is an analogue
of Lemma 5 from Section 3. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 5; we omit it here.
I Lemma 12. The following hold for any stable matching M ′′ in G′′:
1. For any h ∈ H, M ′′ matches at most q+(h) non-dummy residents across all its level
copies in G′′.
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2. The matching M ′′ in G′′ leaves only the level-(` − 1) copy of any hospital (if it exists)
under-subscribed.
3. Let hs ∈ H′′ be active in M ′′. Then,
a. At least one position of hs−1 is matched in M ′′ to a dummy resident at level-(s− 1).
b. For 0 ≤ j ≤ s−2, hj is inactive in M ′′ and all positions of hj are matched to dummy
residents of level-(j).
c. For s + 2 ≤ j ≤ ` − 1, hj is inactive in M ′′ and all positions of hj are matched to
dummy residents of level-(j − 1).
4. For any h ∈ H, at most two consecutive level copies hs and hs+1 are active in M ′′.
5. A level-s resident r in M ′′ does not have any hospital h in its preference list which is
active at level-(s+ 2) in M ′′.
5.2 Popularity of the matching
In order to compute a matching that popular amongst all the maximum cardinality feasible
matchings, we execute the following algorithm. Construct the graph G′′ and compute a
stable matchingM ′′ in G′′. Because of the invariants onM ′′, there exists a natural map from
M ′′ to a matchingM in G. LetM(h) = R∩
(⋃`−1
s=0M
′′(hs)
)
. We prove thatM = map(M ′′)
is popular amongst all maximum cardinality feasible matchings in G.
Division of residents and hospitals into subsets: As in Section 4, we divide residents
and hospitals into subsets based on a stable matching M ′′ in G′′. Thus Ri is the set of non-
dummy residents matched to a level-i hospital hi in M ′′, Hi is the set of hospitals that are
active at level-i in M ′′, unmatched residents are in R0. Also, if M(h) = ∅ then h ∈ H(|R|−1)
if q−(h) = 0 and h ∈ H`−1 if q−(h) > 0. The following lemma summarizes the properties of
a matching M in G where M = map(M ′′) and M ′′ is a stable matching in G′′.
I Lemma 13. Let M be a matching in G such that M = map(M ′′) and M ′′ is a stable
matching in G′′.
1. Each hospital is present in at most two sets Hj , Hj+1 for some j. We say that h ∈
Hj ∩Hj+1.
2. If h ∈ Hj ∩Hj+1, then there is no edge from h to any r ∈ Ri where i ≤ j − 1.
3. All the non-lower-quota hospitals that are undersubscribed in M are in H(|R|−1).
4. All the deficient lower-quota hospitals from M are in H(`−1).
5. If a non-lower-quota hospital is undersubscribed, it has no edge to any resident in R0.
If a lower-quota hospital is deficient it does not have an edge to any resident in Ri for
i ≤ ` − 1. Similarly an unmatched resident does not have an edge to any hospital in
H1 ∪ . . . ∪H`−1.
6. Let h ∈ H be such that |M(h)| > q−(h). Then h /∈ H|R| ∪ . . . ∪H(`−1).
In Theorem 14 below, we prove that M = map(M ′′) is feasible in G if M ′′ is stable in G′′.
I Theorem 14. If G admits a feasible matching then the map M of any stable matching
M ′′ in G′′ is feasible.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 7. Assume, for the sake of contradiction,
thatM is not feasible and hence there is a hospital h such that |M(h)| < q−(h). We need to
consider M ⊕N where N is a feasible matching in G. As N is feasible, |N(h)| ≥ q−(h) and
hence there must be a path ρ in the decomposition ofM⊕N with h as one of its end-points.
The first case is that the other end-point of ρ is a hospital h′ and hence the last edge of ρ
must be a M -edge (call this Case 1). In the second case, the other end-point of ρ is a a
resident r, implying last edge of ρ is a N -edge (call this Case 2).
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Consider Case 1. As the path ends at h′ with an M -edge, |M(h′)| > |N(h′)| ≥ q−(h′).
Then, by part 6 of Lemma 13, h′ ∈ H0 ∪ . . . ∪ H(|R|−1). Also, by part 4 of Lemma 13,
h ∈ H(`−1). Then, by a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 7, the length of ρ
exceeds the sum of lower-quotas of all the hospitals and hence such a path can not exist.
When ρ ends in a resident r, and hence the last edge is a N -edge, r is unmatched in M
and hence must be in R0. A similar argument applies in this case as well, for the sub-path
of ρ where we consider the first hospital hj such that hj ∈ H|R| and for each hi, i < j,
hi ∈ H(|R|+1) ∪ . . . ∪H(`−1). We omit the details. J
We need the following lemma and theorem for proving popularity of M . They are
analogues of Lemma 8 and Theorem 9 respectively from Section 4.
I Lemma 15. Let M1 be any feasible matching. Let (r, h) ∈ M and (r′, h) ∈ M1 such that
r′ =corrh(r,M,M1). Further let h ∈ Hj ∩Hj+1 and r ∈ Rj+1. Further, let r′ ∈ Rj. Then
the label on (r′, h) edge is (−1,−1).
Let ρ be a path inM⊕M1 whereM is the map of a stable matchingM ′′ in G′′ andM1 is
any feasible matching in G. Here ρ is constructed according to the decomposition described
in Section 2. The labels are assigned according to the voting described in Section 2.
I Theorem 16. Let ρ = 〈h0, r1, h1, r2, h2, . . . , ht, rt+1〉. Moreover, let h0 ∈ Hp ∩Hp+1 and
rt+1 ∈ Rq. Then the number of (1, 1) edges in ρ is at most the number of (−1,−1) edges
plus q− p. Thus (rk, hk) ∈M for all k and (hk, rk+1) ∈M1 with rk+1 =corrhk(rk,M,M1).
Now we prove that M is a maximum cardinality feasible matching in G.
I Theorem 17. There is no feasible matching N such that |N | > |M |.
Proof. For contradiction, assume that there exists a feasible matching N in G such that
|N | > |M |. Then, in the decomposition of M ⊕ N , there must be a path with both end-
points unmatched / under-subscribed in M . Let ρ be such a path. One end-point of ρ must
be a hospital h and other end-point must be a resident r. Then |M(h)| < |N(h)| and hence
h ∈ ⋃`−1i=|R|−1Hi by part 3 of Lemma 13. Also, r ∈ R0 by the way division of R into subsets
is defined. Let ρ = 〈r, h0, r0, h1, r1, . . . , ht, rt, h〉 where (hi, ri) ∈ M for 0 ≤ i ≤ t. As an
unmatched resident has edges only to hospitals in H0 (cf. part 5 of Lemma 13), h0 ∈ H0 and
hence r0 ∈ R0 since r0 = M(h0). Now again, by part 2 of Lemma 13, r0 has no edge to any
hospital in H2∪ . . .∪H(`−1). Hence h1 ∈ H0∪H1. Continuing this argument, hi ∈
⋃i
j=0Hj .
But then h has no edge to any resident in
⋃|R|−2
j=0 and so rt ∈ R|R|−1. Therefore t ≥ |R|−1.
But then the number of residents on ρ is |R| + 1, which is not possible. Hence there is no
augmenting path with respect to M in G. J
In the theorem below, we prove that M is popular amongst all the feasible matchings of
maximum cardinality.
I Theorem 18. Let N be any feasible matching in G.
1. If ρ is an alternating cycle in M ⊕N , then ∆(M ⊕ ρ,M) ≤ ∆(M,M ⊕ ρ).
2. If ρ is an alternating path in M ⊕ N with one end-point matched in M , then ∆(M ⊕
ρ,M) ≤ ∆(M,M ⊕ ρ).
Proof. Let ρ be an alternating cycle in M ⊕ N . Further, let (r, h) ∈ ρ ∩M . Then ρ′ =
ρ\{(r, h)} is an alternating path from h to r which starts and ends at the same level. Hence
the number of (1, 1) edges on ρ′ is at most the number of (−1,−1) edges on ρ′. The same
holds for ρ.
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Let ρ be an alternating path in M ⊕N with exactly one end-point matched in M . Thus
ρ has even length, and both its end-points are either hospitals or both are residents.
Consider the first case. So let ρ = 〈h0, r1, h1, . . . , rt, ht〉 where (ri, hi) ∈ M for all i.
Also, as N is feasible, q+(h) ≥ |N(h)| > |M(h)|. By part 3 of Lemma 13 and feasibility of
M , h0 ∈
⋃`−1
i=|R|−1Hi. By feasibility of N , ht ∈
⋃|R|−1
i=0 Hi. As (rt, ht) ∈ M , r ∈
⋃|R|−1
i=0
by the definition of levels. Consider the subpath ρ′ = ρ \ {(rt, ht)} i.e. the path obtained
by removing the edge (rt, ht) from ρ. Applying Theorem 16 to ρ′ with p ≥ |R| − 1 and
q ≤ |R| − 1, we get that the number of (1, 1) edges on ρ′ is at most the number of (−1,−1)
edges on ρ′.
Consider the case when both the end-points of ρ are residents. Thus ρ =
〈r0, h1, r1, . . . , ht, rt〉 where (hi, ri) ∈ M for all i. Again consider ρ′ = ρ \ {(ht, rt)}. As
r0 is unmatched in M , r0 ∈ R0 by the definition of levels. Applying Theorem 16 to ρ′ with
q = 0, we get that the number of (1, 1) edges on ρ′ is at most the number of (−1,−1) edges
on ρ′. J
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